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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
accordance with the recorded plat. 0 However, the actual open-
ing of the streets by the municipality is not a "ministerial duty
required by law" and, in the absence of any abuse of discretion
in the refusal to open any of these streets, mandamus does not
lie to force such action. 37
In Jefferson Parish School Board v. Assets Realization Co., 8
there was a resolution which formally dedicated "all streets,
avenues, highways, drives, drainage canal areas, and etc., as
shown hereon." The fact that the plat contained a square marked
"Reserved for Schools" was held not sufficient to show a de-
liberate intent to dedicate because it was also consistent with
the possibility of sale or other transfer for school purposes.
However, there was enough difference in Best Oil Co. v. Parish
Council of the Parish of East Baton Rouge39 for the court to
find an unequivocal intent to dedicate a drainage canal area in





It now seems to be the generally accepted rule that an olo-
graphic will dated in the slash form which is uncertain as to
the day, month, or year' is invalid, and that no extrinsic evi-
dence is admissible to resolve the uncertainty.2 This rule was
36. No mention is made of the Supreme Court decision to the same effect:
Parish of Jefferson v. Doody, 247 La. 839, 174 So. 2d 798 (1965), and comments
in 26 LA. L. REv. 467-68 (1966).
37. LA. ConE OF CrVIL PROCEDURE arts. 3861 et seq. (1960).
38. 182 So. 2d 818 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
39. 176 So. 2d 630 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965), writ refused, 248 La. 365, 178
So.2d 656 (1965).
*Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. It must be conceded that there is no uncertainty in a slash date such as
12/12/60, 8/8/60, 9/13/60. whether the first date is 12 December or December
"12, makes no difference. The same applies to the second illustration. As to the
third, it can only mean September 13th, for there are only 12 months in the year.
As to the century, see Succession of Kron, 172 La. 666, 135 So. 19 (1931).
2. For a critical review of the jurisprudence on this question see Successions
of Gaudin, 98 So. 2d 711 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957) ; 140 So. 2d 384 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1962), noted and discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
[Vol. XXVII
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recently re-affirmed in Succession of Gafford,3 but it is inter-
esting to note that although the date in question (10/3/60) was
patently ambiguous, the court nevertheless finds that it is a
date certain and that it means October 3, 1960; and this, without
resorting to extrinsic evidence but solely by reference to the
several documents offered for probate. In his olographic testa-
ment dated March 23, 1951, the testator had appointed Molly
Flanagan as his executrix and instituted her as his universal
legatee. Thereafter, the testator changed the date of the will to
September 14, 1960, and at the same time substituted Frank
Mathews as his executor and universal legatee explaining on the
reverse of the testament that these changes were necessitated
by the death of Molly Flanagan. In addition to this will, there
was also offered for probate as a codicil thereto, an addendum
containing particular legacies bearing the questionable date
"10/3/60," in which the testator directed Frank, the substituted
executor, to pay the legacies therein made. This codicil was
promptly attacked as invalid under the rule above stated. It
was an easy matter for the court to conclude that the date on
the codicil had to be October 3, 1960, for it was impossible for
it to have been executed before September 14, the date on which
the changes in the original will had been made. 4
Article 1579 of the Civil Code provides that if the testator
declares that he does not know how or cannot sign the nun-
cupative will by public act, the notary must make express men-
tion of this declaration in the act of superscription as well as
of the cause that prevents the testator from signing.5 In Stelly
v. Stelly," the opponents of the will alleged its invalidity on the
Courts for the 1961-1962 Term -Successions and Donations, 23 LA. L. REV.
266 (1963). See also The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1964-
1966 Term--Successions and Donations, 26 LA. L. REV. 468 (1966).
3. 180 So. 2d 74 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
4. "If the slash date on the codicil is read as March 10, 1960, it would mean
that the codicil was drafted prior to the death of Molly * * * and prior to the
alterations of the testament, and such an interpretation would be inconsistent with
the testator's intention as clearly stated and unchanged before September 14, 1960.
However, if the slash date is read as October 3, 1960 this construction gives to
the codicil meaning. Manifestly then, it would have been drafted subsequent to
the death of Molly * * * which necessitated the changes in the will as first
written." Id. at 77.
It will be noted that but for the fact that the codicil directs Frank, the new
executor appointed on September 14, 1960, to pay the particular legacies in ques-
tion, the codicil might well have been declared null.
5. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1579 (1870) : "[The nuncupative testament by public
act] must ,be signed by the testator; if he declares that he knows not how, or is
not able to sign, express mention of his declaration, as also of the cause that
hinders him from signing, must be made in the act."
6. 175 So. 2d 829 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
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grounds that (1) the notary "did not test the ability of the
testatrix to sign her name in the presence of all the witnesses
as required by Article 1578 of the Civil Code," and (2) that
the act of superscription did not satisfy the requirements of
article 1579 of the Civil Code. Both of these objections were
summarily rejected by the court. As to the first, there is nothing
in article 1578 that requires the notary to "test the ability of the
testator" to sign his name in the presence of witnesses. 7 As to
the second, the act of superscription prepared by the notary was
to the effect that the testatrix declared that although she knew
how to read and write, she was then unable to sign her name
due to her illness, and that if she attempted to sign, the signa-
ture would be illegible. Such a statement, the court properly
concludes, fully satisfies the provisions of the Code.8
The purpose of the Civil Code articles prescribing the for-
malities which must be observed in the confection of testaments
is undoubtedly to guard against imposition, fraud, or deception,
and it is clear that nothing short of strict compliance with these
formalities will satisfy the requirements of the law.9 There is
no reason why this rule should not also be extended and applied
to the statutory will authorized by section 2442 of title 9 of the
7. This article merely sets forth the requirements as to how this testament
must be dictated and received by the notary in the presence of the necessary
number of witnesses, observing that these formalities must be fulfilled at one time
without interruption.
8. This is in accord with prior jurisprudence to the effect that article 1579
calls only for a statement of the cause that hinders the testator from signing,
and that the notary is not required to set forth in detail the nature of such cause.
See Succession of Davis v. Richardson, 226 La. 887, 77 So. 2d 524 (1955) where
the declaration was simply that the testatrix was unable to sign "due to her
physical condition."
In the case under consideration, the notary's declaration is actually more
descriptive of the cause that hindered the testatrix from signing.
9. LA. CIVIL COnE art. 1595 (1870) : "The formalities to which testaments
are subject by the provisions of the present section, must be observed; otherwise
the testaments are null and void." (Emphasis added).
In the following cases the testaments were declared null because the formalities
required for each had not been strictly observed: Succession of Vidal, 44 La. Ann.
41, 10 So. 414 (1892) (nuncupative will by public act) ; Vernon v. Vernon's Heirs,
6 La. Ann. 242 (1851) (nuncupative will by private act) ; Stafford v. Villain, 10
La. 319 (1836) (mystic will) ; Succession of Armant, 43 La. Ann. 310, 9 So. 50
(1891) (olographic will). The writer has discovered but one case in which this
principle went apparently unnoticed. See Condon v. McCormick, 134 So. 2d 619,
626 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961) in which a nuncupative will by private act was up-
held although it was apparent that the formalities prescribed by articles 1581 and
1582 of the Civil Code had not been strictly adhered to, the court concluding that
there had been a "substantial and sufficient compliance" with the provisions
thereof. See criticism of this case in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts
for the 1961-1962 Term- Successions and Donations, 23 LA. L. REV. 266 (1963),
and of. Vernon v. Vernon's Heirs, 6 La. Ann. 242 (1851).
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Louisiana Revised Statutes, ° especially in view of the manda-
tory provisions thereof, and this was particularly emphasized
by the Second Circuit Court of Appeal in Succession of Michie,"
in which the purported statutory testament was neither signed
at the.conclusion thereof as provided by law, 12 nor did it contain
the required act of superscription or attestation clause that the
notary must make. 3 As the court pointed out, although the
statute provides that the attestation clause need not be in the
exact language of the statute but that it may be in a form sub-
stantially similar thereto, nevertheless an attestation clause is
certainly required and without it, the testament is null.' 4
Capacity To Give and To Receive
Article 1489 of the Civil Code provides that ministers of the
gospel are incapable of receiving donations inter vivos or mortis
causa from those whom they have attended during the sickness
of which they die, when such donations are made during that
sickness. The case of Coleman v. Winsey 5 raises the interesting
question whether article 1489 is applicable where the donor who
has suffered from chronic hardening of the arteries for a con-
siderable period of time prior to his death, makes a donation
during such period but more than one year prior to his fatal
heart attack.'0 The opinion of the court is that arteriosclerosis
10. LA. R.S. 9:2442 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1964, No. 23.
11. 183 So. 2d 436 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966).
12. Although the statute is susceptible of the construction that the will must
be signed by the notary, the testator and the witnesses at the conclusion of the
dispositive provisions, and that it must again be signed by them following the
act of superscription prepared by the notary, the Supreme Court had held that
all that the statute requires is that the signature of the testator, of the notary,
and of the witnesses be affixed in the presence of each other under the attestation
clause. Succession of Eck, 233 La. 764, 98 So. 2d 181 (1957) ; Succession of
Nourse, 234 La. 691, 101 So. 2d 204 (1958).
13. In the will in question, the signatures of the witneses and of the testator
appeared at the end of the dispositive provisions, following which was the notary's
certification that the testator's signature was authentic. It was apparent, there-
fore, and it was conceded that the testament lacked the necessary attestation
clause.
14. It has been previously observed that because of the comparatively few
requirements imposed, it should not be too difficult for a competent notary to
properly observe and comply with these requirements. See The Work of the Lou-
isiana Appellate Courts for the 1962-1963 Term -Successions and Donations, 24
LA. L. REV. 184, 186 n. 7 (1964). And it is regrettable that in Michie, supra,
where more than one-half million dollars was involved, the will of the deceased
could not be carried out. But, as the court indicates, the fault lay not with the
law, but with the deceased himself who failed to avail himself of competent pro-
fessional advice and assistance.
15. 183 So. 2d 118 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
16. It is shown that the will was made on April 8, 1960, and that the de-
ceased died on March 8, 1961. Cf. Succession of Price, 172 La. 606, 612, 134 So.
907, 909 (1931) in which the deceased died more than one year after making her
1967]
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is a degenerative disease related to the aging process in which
heart failure is a distinct probability, but that it does not neces-
sarily constitute the last sickness of the deceased within the
meaning of article 1489 of the Code, especially where it is shown
that the donation was made long before the fatal attack anid that
the deceased required no special medical treatment prior to his
death. It is strongly intimated that in such cases the cause of
death is the fatal heart attack and not the chronic arteriosclerotic
condition of the deceased. 17
In Succession of Bisso,'5 where the testamentary capacity of
the deceased was attacked on the grounds of insanity, the court
found the evidence insufficient to show that the testator was
insane at the time the will was confected, although there was
ample testimony to show that for a time prior to his death his
behavior was such as to attest to an irrational mind. Accord-
ingly, the will was declared valid, the court taking occasion to
reiterate the prior jurisprudence to the effect that the fact that
the deceased is in poor physical condition and may be suffering
from diseases generally attendant upon the aged and infirm, is
not sufficient to deprive him of his right to make testamentary
dispositions. 9
Animus Testandi
In two cases, Succession of Gafford20 and Succession of Ham-
will and in which the court simply states: "In the case at bar, the last will and
testament was made May 4. 1925 and the testatrix did not die until May 13,
1926. Article 1489 of the Civil Code is not applicable therefore to the legacy made
by the testatrix in favor of Rev. 1-. C. Smith." (Emphasis added.) Cf. LA. CIVIL
CODE arts. 3199, 3200, 3201 (1870) (re: privilege for expenses at last sickness).
17. "There is no question but what the will in this case was written long
before the fatal heart attack, or the heart failure that caused the patient's death,
and there is no evidence in the record which indicates that for a period of ten
months prior to the death of the testatrix she needed medical treatment of any
kind. When treated by the doctor some two months after the will was written
she apparently was in no worse condition than she was on his first visit in July
of 1959.
"The plaintiff's theory of the case is that once a person is diagnosed as having
hardening of the arteries, if that person ever dies as a result thereof, making a
minister or doctor who had administered to her a legatee under the will would be
prohibited. This is an extension of Article 1489 which is not warranted." (Em-
phasis added.) 183 So. 2d 118, 121.
18. 186 So. 2d 692 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 249 La. 705, 190
So.2d 229 (1966).
19. See Succession of Prejean, 224 La. 921, 71 So. 2d 328 (1954) to the effect
that the fact that a person is suffering from arteriosclerosis, high blood pressure,
hypertension an'd is 86 yeiis of age and has had a heart attack is not sufficient to
show that he was mentally incompetent to make a will.
20. 180 So. 2d 74 (La. App; 2d Cir. 1965).
[Vol. XXVII
PRIVATE LAW
mett,21 the olographs of the deceased offered for probate were
attacked as lacking testamentary intent.22 In both, the opponents
relied on the recent decision in Succession of Shows2- in which
it is intimated that in order to be valid as a will, the document
must contain certain magic words of disposability. In Gafford,
the dispositions were in the following form: "Frank, in settling
my estate my instructions are as follows - Pay to * * * $10,000
each. * * * The balance to be paid to my first cousins. * * * The
diamond rings * * * I will to Ruth * * *." The court concluded
that the words "pay to" sufficed as testamentary dispositive
words. In Hammett, the dispositions were as follows:
"75% of all [of testator's property] to Sam * * * to be
held in trust * * * until Sam is 35 years old.
"25% of all [of testator's property] to James H. Atkin-
son.
"Donald Albert Hammet is no longer my husband and I
leave him nothing."
For the opponents, it was contended that even if the word
"leave" appearing in the last paragraph of the document actually
satisfied the requirement of clearly indicating an animus tes-
tandi, that the same could not be said of the first two para-
graphs. Although the court construes the word "leave" as a
dispositive word,24 it seems to favor a rule of construction that
would require a consideration of the instrument as a whole on
its own merits and a determination whether the testator intended
it as the vehicle for the transmission of his property upon his
death. It therefore holds that, considering the document taken
as a whole, it clearly indicated that the deceased intended to con-
21. 183 So. 2d 416 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
22. The contention being that neither of the documents contained words of
disposition such as I will, bequeath, or devise, etc.
23. Succession of Shows, 246 La. 652, 656, 166 So. 2d 261, 263 (1964) noted
in 25 LA. L. REV. 310, 313 (1965) in which the purported testament was simply
as follows: "All to my sister," and wherein the Supreme Court held it was not a
will because it "totally lacked any language to indicate the animus testandi of
the decedent and the necessary words to constitute a valid will." In the opinion
rendered by the court of appeal (158 So. 2d 293, 296) the following is quoted with
approval from Succession of Foggard, 152 So. 2d 627 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963):
"Nor does the instrument contain the words 'give,' 'donate,' 'will,' 'bequeath,'
'devise.' or any other word establishing or even indicating that it is a disposition
of a last will."
24. "This document contains the word 'leave.' One trained in the law might
prefer the use of words such as 'bequeath' or 'devise,' but we are dealing with a
document written by a person not so trained, and certainly 'leave,' when used by a
layman, indicates the necessary intent." 183 So. 2d 416, 418.
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vey her property in the manner indicated upon her death, and
that therefore, it constituted her last will and testament. To this
writer this seems a sounder approach, for there is no mandatory
requirement in the legislation that a testament must contain
particular words of disposition. On the contrary, in the language
of the Code, it suffices that "the clauses it contains or the man-
ner in which it is made, clearly establish that it is a disposition
of last will. ' 25 And it is suggested that a document can be a valid
testament and can be construed only as such, even if it contains
none of the so-called words of disposition. Take for example the
olograph in Gafford, supra, containing the testatrix's instruc-
tions to her executor as to the manner of "settling" her estate.26
DONATIONS AND TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS
Disposable Portion and Lgitime
Articles 1493-1496 of the Civil Code clearly indicate that the
patrimony of a person leaving forced heirs is divided by opera-
tion of law into two parts, one of which is freely alienable and
of which he may dispose gratuitously in favor of anyone, and
the other which must be reserved for the forced heirs and which
is and must remain essentially inalienable 21 in the sense that it is
protected by law against gratuitous inter vivos or testamentary
dispositions, for it must descend to the forced heirs in full owner-
ship, free of any charges, conditions, or restrictions.28 It follows,
25. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1570 (1870) : "No disposition mortis causa shall hence-
forth be made otherwise than by last will or testament. But the name given to the
act of last will is of no importance, provided that the clauses it contains, or the
manner in which it is made, clearly establish that it is a disposition of last will."
26. Cf. Succession of Ehrenberg, 21 La. Ann. 280 (1869); and see Succession
of Torlage, 202 La. 693, 12 So. 2d 683 (1943).
27. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1493 (1870) :•"Donations inter vivos or mortis causa
cannot exceed two-thirds of the property of the disposer, if he leaves at his decease
a legitimate child .... "
LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1495 (1870): "In the cases prescribed by the two last
preceding articles, the heirs are called forced heirs, because the donor cannot de-
prive them of the portion of his estate reserved to them by law ... " (Emphasis
added.)
LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1496 (1870) : "Where there are no [forced heirs] . . .
donations inter vivos or mortis causa may be made to the whole amount of the
property of the disposer .... "
LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1498 (1870) : "The legitimate portion of which the testator
is forbidden to dispose to the prejudice of his descendants being once fixed by the
number of children living or represented . . . does not diminish by the renunciation
of one or any of them. . . ." (Emphasis added.)
28. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1710 (1870). Exception is made, of course, where the
legitime of forced heirs may be burdened with a usufruct by operation of law.
See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 915, 916 (1870) ; Succession of Moore, 40 La. Ann. 531,
4 So. 460 (1888) ; Winsberg v. Winsberg, 233 La. 67, 96 So. 2d 44 (1957).
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therefore, that the right to the legitime is a right arising ab-
intestato which cannot be controlled, limited, nor qualified by
any disposition of the testator.29
The disposable portion, on the other hand, may be freely
disposed of gratuitously in favor of any person, and it may even
be given to one or more of the forced heirs of the donor.30 Never-
theless, because the equality that the law requires must be ob-
served among the heirs of the donor,3 1 when the disposable por-
tion or a part thereof has been given to one or more of the forced
heirs, it must be returned to the mass of the succession to be
divided equally among all of them, except where it has been
given as an extra portion or where the donee has renounced the
succession in order to keep his donation.32 These principles could
not have been better illustrated than in Succession of Williams,3
where the testatrix made a bequest of all her property to the
children of her only son, subject to a usufruct in favor of the
latter. Since there was one forced heir, it was clear that she was
prohibited from disposing of more than two-thirds, and that the
legitime of one-third must descend to her child ab-intestato in
full ownership, free from any charges, conditions, or restrictions.
What the testatrix had a right to dispose of, therefore, and what
she actually bequeathed, was the naked ownership of two-thirds
of her succession in favor of her grandchildren and of the usu-
fruct thereon in favor of the child. The judgment awarding the
son his legitime of one-third in full ownership as well as the
legacy of the usufruct of the disposable portion was eminently
correct.
34
29. Succession of Turnell, 32 La. Ann. 1218 (1880).
30. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1501 (1870).
31. Id. arts. 1228, 1229.
32. Id. arts. 1231, 1501, 1237.
33. 184 So. 2d 70 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
34. The Williams case, 8upra, has been criticized on the grounds that it "con-
travenes the normal rule that a forced heir cannot claim both the lgitime and a
testamentary bequest," and that "no support for [the decision] other than two
Louisiana cases" was offered by the court. See Note, 41 TUL. L. REv. 210, 213
(1966).
It is true that in Miller v. Miller, 105 La. 257, 29 So. 802 (1901) and in
Succession of Fertel, 208 La. 614, 23 So. 2d 234 (1945), on which the author of
the note in the Tulane Law Review relies, the court concluded that the legacy to
the forced heir had to be imputed to the reserved portion and that therefore, he
could not claim the legacy in addition to this legitime. But it must be noted that
the reason for this conclusion was that this was clearly found to be the un-
equivocal intention of the testator, and not because such was the normal rule of
law. Thus in Miller, the court states: "All we are called to do is to ascertain [the
testator's] intentions and enforce them. We think his intention and wish are clear,
that the whole estate, less $20,000 to be first paid to the minor, should vest in
his other children share and share alike. . . ." (105 La. at 261, 29 So. at 804).
19671
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Life Insurance and Annuities
It seems to have been firmly established bythe jurisprudence
that the proceeds of life insurance payable to a designated bene-
ficiary other than the estate of the insured form no part of the
succession of the insured, but inure to the named beneficiary
directly and by the sole terms of the policy itself; but that the
unpaid balance of an annuity contract payable to a designated
beneficiary surviving the annuitant forms part of the succession
of the latter, with the resulting differences that in the one case,
such unpaid balance must be included in the mass for the pur-
poses of determining legitime and the disposable portion, but not
in the other.3 5 In 1944, however, the legislature enacted a statute
providing that "all proceeds, avails and dividends of all policies
of health and accident insurance, annuity insurance and endow-
ment insurance, shall in every respect and for all purposes have
and enjoy the same legal status" then accorded to the proceeds
of life insurance,30 the obvious purposes being to abolish the
"It was evidently his desire that his entire property, less $20,000 should be
bequeathed to his children, and not to his grandchild; that the grandchild should
not receive more than $20,000." (Emphasis added.) 105 La. at 265, 29 So. at 805.
And in Fertel, the court states: "The contention of Barney Fertel that he should
be awarded, in addition to his legitime, the legacy of $100 per month to be paid
out of the disposable portion, is discussed in the opinion of the trial court which
we have hereinabove quoted. As is correctly shown in the opinion, it is obvious
that it was not the intention of the testatri.r to give Barney Fertel the legacy of
$100 a month in addition to his legitime...." (Emphasis added.) 208 La. 614,
637, 23 So. 2d at 241.
It must be conceded that in an intestate succession, where a donation has been
made to one of the forced heirs and is not otherwise exempt from collation, the
donee may elect to keept the donation only if he renounces the succession of the
donor. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1237 (1870). It must also be conceded that gratuitous
dispositions in favor of third persons, whether inter vivos or testamentary, must
be imputed to the disposable portion for the reserved portion of the forced heir
must remain intact. Again, it is also 'clear that such gratuitous dispositions when
made in favor of one of the forced heirs are generally imputed to the reserved
portion unless declared to be made as an advantage or extra portion. Id. art. 1228.
In other words, as against his coheirs, a forced heir cannot keep his donation
inter vivos in addition to his legitime unless the donation was expressly declared
to have been given as an extra portion. By the same token, he cannot "claim his
legacy" in addition to his legitime, unless the legacy was likewise intended as an
extra portion. That the declaration that the donation is exempt from collation
or that it is made as an extra portion need not be expressly made when the dona-
tion is mortls causa, and that therefore, the question whether the legacy will be
imputed to the disposable portion or to the legitime will be resolved in favor of
the heir-legatee, unless the testator has expressed a contrary intention, should be
the deciding factor. Cf. Jordan v. Filmore, 167 La. 725, 120 So. 275 (1929).
Thus, in a contest among forced heirs,'the legacy should always be imputed to the
disposable portion in all cases where the testator has not declared otherwise. In
Williams, supra, to whom would the legacy of the usufruct of the disposable
quantum had gone if not to the forced heir?
35. Sizeler v. Sizeler, 170 La. 128, 127 So. 388 (1930) ; Succession of Rabouin,
201 La. 227, 9 So. 2d 529 (1942).
36. La. Acts 1944, No. 221.
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distinction theretofore made by the courts. The statute was in
effect until expressly repealed by the Louisiana Insurance Code
of 1948.37 And although in Succession of Pedrick35 the statute
was held inapplicable because it was not in effect at the time
of the annuitant's death, it is clear that, at least in those cases
where the unpaid balance of the annuity contract has become
exigible during the life of the statute, such unpaid balance should
be treated in the same manner as proceeds of life insurance pay-
able to third-party beneficiaries. The Second Circuit Court of
Appeal so held in Succession of Lantz, 39 in which the court ruled
that as between the beneficiary of the unpaid balance of the
annuity and his coheirs, such unpaid balance passes to him, not
ab-intestato, but as the beneficiary thereof under and by virtue
of the terms of the contract.
Collation
That manual gifts were per se exempt from collation was
evidently the theory of the plaintiffs' case in Succession of
Browne40 in which they sought to bring back into the succession
of the deceased alleged donations inter vivos in the form of
manual gifts to one of the donor's children. As to one of these
items (a $10,000 check given by the donor to her son-in-law to
remodel his home into which the donor had moved permanently)
the court found the gift to have been used solely for the benefit
and convenience of the donor and consequently not subject to
collation.41 The same was true also of the second item which
consisted of approximately $3,000 that the donor's daughter had
expended for groceries, clothing, and other articles for the per-
sonal use of the donor. The third item consisted of household
furniture and appliances valued at some $726 which the donor
had given to her daughter but which the court concluded was a
gift such as was usual for parents to give to their children with-
out regard to an accounting therefor, and consequently not sub-
ject to collation. Though there is language in the opinion from
which one may infer that a manual gift would, as such, be re-
garded as exempt from collation, 42 it is evident that the court's
37. La. Acts 1948, No. 195. As far as the writer has been able to determine,
the statute has never been re-enacted.
38. Succession of Pedrick, 207 La. 640, 21 So. 2d 859 (1945).
39. 176 So. 2d 224 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966).
40. 176 So. 2d 217 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
41. The court also points out that in no event was this gift subject to collation
inasmuch as it was not a gift to one of the donor's heirs.
42. See for example the following: "As to the first of the enumerated items,
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decision is in accord with the position of the Supreme Court in
Succession of Gomez,43 wherein the court categorically states
that manual gifts are not per se exempt from collation.
In Succession of Delesdernier,44 the court reiterates the juris-
prudential rule that collation cannot be demanded after a judg-
ment sending the heirs into possession,45 except of course where
the judgment of possession is itself a nullity. As to valid dona-
tions made by the deceased to the coheirs of the plaintiff, there-
fore, the petition for collation was held to come too late since a
the [lower] court held that the $10,000 war a manual gift to Morris L. Witten
and observed that in no event was it subject to collation inasmuch as Witten was
not one of Mrs. Browne's heirs .... The conclusion that Mrs. Browne's check to
Witten represented a manual gift of the fund is, in our opinion, correct. Nor do
we find any error in the observation that in no event could the gift be subject to
collition."
43. Id. at 219. 223 La. 859, 67 So. 2d 156 (1953). Cf. LeBlanc v. Volker,
198 So. 398, 401 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1940) where the court states: "A manual
gift is not subject to collation. . . . The transfer of the homestead stock in this
case, was, in view of the provisions of the Uniform Stock Transfer Statute, a
valid donation inter vivos, but it is, nevertheless, the subject of collation, since it
is not and could not be the subject of a manual gift."
44. 184 So. 2d 37 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
45. The rule seems to be based on the proposition that since collation is due
only to the succession of the donor, once the succession has been closed by the
rendition of a judgment of possession, collation is no longer possible. In Doll v.
Doll, 206 La. 550, 560-61, 19 So. 2d 249, 252 (1944), in which the rule seems to
have had its inception, the court states: "If the descendant heirs of a deceased
person accept his or her succession unconditionally and obtain a judgment sending
them into possession of the estate as owners, and thus close the succession, the
heirs are thenceforth co-proprietors of the property theretofore belonging to the
succession in the same manner as if they had acquired their joint ownership by
purchase instead of acquiring it by inheritance."
There appears to be no justification for the rule in Doll v. Doll. (1) The
concept of a succession as a fictitious entity which represented the deceased until
delivery of the effects thereof to the heir and which became part of the Louisiana
law through Las Siete Partidas (Partidas 6.14.1; La. Civil Code of 1808, p. 162,
art. 74) was discarded in favor of the French doctrine "le mort saisit le vif' in
the Code of 1825. (2) The succession is acquired by the heir immediately upon
the death of the deceased by operation of law (LA. CIVIL CODE art. 940 (1870))
who is considered as having succeeded to the deceased from the instant of his
death (id. art. 944). (3) The judgment of possession merely recognizes the heir
as the owner, and be acquires nothing by the judgment which only sends him into
possession of what is his already by operation of law. (4) A judgment of posses-
sion is not a judgment translative of ownership and cannot form the basis for
acquisitive prescription. Tyler v. Lewis, 143 La. 229, 78 So. 477 (1918) ; Everett
v. Clayton, 211 La. 211, 29 So. 2d 769 (1947). (5) The judgment of possession
is only prima facie evidence of the relationship to the deceased of the parties recog-
nized therein as the heirs or legatees, and of their rights to the possession of the
property that belonged to the deceased at the time of his death, but which now
belongs to them. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3062 (1960).
It is evident therefore that co-heirs are co-owners in indivision from the
moment of the death of the deceased and that they do not become such by virtue
of the judgment of possession. Although collation is said to be due "only to the
succession of the donor" (LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1242 (1870)) what is meant is
that collation is the return to the mass of the succession as defined in Article 872
of the Civil Code, viz.: "the estate . . . which a person leaves after his death."
It seems inaccurate to say, therefore, that the heirs become co-proprietors of the
property which before the judgment of possession belonged to the succession.
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valid judgment of possession had already been rendered. But
the plaintiff also alleged that some of the so-called donations
were in fact pure and simple simulations. As to these, the court
properly concludes that the plaintiff had the right to re-open
the succession in order to include in the inventory of the effects
thereof, the property alleged to have been the subject of the
simulations, since a simulation conveys nothing and consequently
the property is deemed never to have left the estate of the de-
ceased. This, the court pointed out, did not imply a nullity, but
rather an incompleteness in the succession proceedings, and
therefore the plaintiff should have the opportunity to be sent
into possession of the property not included in the original judg-
ment of possession.
Interpretation of Legacies
In Giroir v. Dumesnil46 the testator bequeathed to his wife
the "enjoyment and usufruct during her life span of all the prop-
erty * * * which I may possess at my death, for her to do with,
enjoy and dispose of as she pleases, and as a thing belonging to
her." The issue was, naturally, whether the bequest was of a
usufruct only, or whether it was a bequest in full ownership.
Reversing the court of appeal which had held that there was no
ambiguity in the disposition and that the bequest was of the
usufruct only, the Supreme Court finds the disposition was am-
biguous and resolves the ambiguity in favor of a disposition in
perfect ownership, taking into consideration not only the scope
of the disposition itself 47 but also the circumstances from which
the probable intention of the testator could be deduced. 48 That
the testator used a prolix method of describing ownership" and
that he only approximated the strict legal meaning of usufruct,
said the court, did not preclude such a construction.
In Succession of Mulqueeny5 the testator bequeathed $5,000
46. 248 La. 1037, 184 So. 2d 1 (1966).
47. "There is no doubt the testator intended the will to cover his community
property interest. .If this is true,'then it would be highly extraordinary for him
to bequeath his wife only the usufruct of his share of the community. property,
when without a will she would have inherited this property in full ownership."
(Id. at 1051, 184 So. 2d at 6).
48. The testimony disclosed that the deceased did not have close relationship
with his collateral relatives, and that it was the mutual understanding of the
testator and his wife, who had made reciprocal wills in favor of each other, that
the survivor would take all of the property the other possessed.
49. "We conclude [that the words] mean that the testator bequeathed to his
wife the perfect ownership of his property: use, enjoyment of the fruits, and right
of disposition." (248 La. at 1054, 184 So. 2d at 7).
50. 248 La. 659, 181 So. 2d 384 (1965).
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to each of his three nieces, and to a longtime friend whom he
named as his executrix, he bequeathed "any and all homestead
stock, or any interest I may have therein" in the various building
and loan associations listed, which totalled some $60,000. 51 The
amount of ready cash in the succession of the deceased was only
$167.20 which was patently insufficient to satisfy the legacies
to the nieces who contended that their legacies should be paid
from the homestead stock since in legal contemplation, such stock
was nothing but cash. The position of the executrix, with whom
the court of appeal had agreed,52 was that by virtue of article
1635 of the Civil Code"" the legacy of stock, being a legacy of a
particular object, had to be paid by preference with the result
that the legacies of the money had failed because of the inade-
quacy of the succession assets. The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that building and loan association stock merely repre-
sents cash on deposit to the credit of the "shareholder" subject
to withdrawal at any time and as such, no different from any
other ordinary bank deposit.. 4 So holding, and by applying the
usual rules of interpretation of testaments, 55 the court had no
difficulty in reaching the conclusion that it was the evident in-
tention of the testator that the executrix should receive only the
residue of the homestead deposits after the cash legacies had
been satisfied.
51. See the Per Curiam id. at 675, 181 So. 2d at 390.
52. Succession of Mulqueeny, 172 So. 2d 326 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
53. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1635 (1870): "If the effects do not suffice to dis-
charge the particular legacies, the legacies of a certain object must be first taken
out. The surplus of the effects must then be proportionately divided among the
legatees of sums of money ... "
54. "This type of building and loan 'stock' or 'shares' has been characterized
by this court as 'merely a deposit of a sum of money at a fixed rate of interest,
the principal and interest being all subject to withdrawal at any time.' Succession
of Homan, 202 La. 591, 605, 12 So. 2d 826 (1943)."
The court also took occasion to re-affirm its decision in Succession of Berdon,
202 La. 607, 12 So. 2d 654 (1943) that the legacy of the stock was not legacy of
a certain object because it was not a legacy of a "definitely designated certificate
of stock." This case was disapproved in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1945-1913 Term - Successions, 5 LA. L. REv. 516, 520 (1944).
55. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1712 (1870): "In the interpretation of acts of last
will, the intention of the testator must principally be endeavored to be ascertained,
without departing, however, from the proper signification of the terms of the testa-
ment."
Id. art. 1713: "A disposition must be understood in the sense in which it cat.
have effect, rather than that in which it can have none."
Id. art. 1715: "When, from the terms made use of by the testator, his intention
can not be ascertained, recourse must be had to all circumstances which may aid
in the discovery of his intention."
Another case in which the above articles were applied was Succession of Davis,
178 -So. 2d 481 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965) in which the court had little difficulty
in concluding that a legacy of "my home at 818 West 3rd St." included not only
the lot on which the home had been built, but also adjoining lots subsequently pur-
chased 'by the testator and incorporated therewith as part thereof.
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